This paper explores whether firms that share common directors also pursue similar corporate policies. Using a sample of 885 U.S. firms with common directors, we find that director fixed effects strongly explain variation in firms' governance, financial, disclosure, and strategic policy choices. Moreover, the director fixed effects provide incremental explanatory power over traditional economic determinants of firms' policies. Consistent with our hypotheses, the director effects are less pronounced in large firms, in firms with more outside board members, and for directors with numerous outside board appointments. Our evidence is more consistent with directors and firms "matching" their policy preferences rather than directors "imposing" their policy preferences on firms.
1 "De gustibus non est disputandum" …Latin maxim
Introduction
In this paper, we explore whether commonality in firms' corporate policies is associated with the presence of common directors across firms. Recent corporate governance scandals have placed the spotlight on directors with multiple board appointments and raised concerns that corporate misdeeds can be traced across directorships (Weil 2002, Wall Street Journal) . This study provides some of the first evidence on the association between firms' portfolios of policy choices and the presence of common directors across firms. While prior research examines the relation between overall board characteristics and corporate policies (see, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001 , for a general survey and Klein, 2002, for evidence on accounting choices), these studies do not address the important question of whether there is an association between firms' policy choices and individual director policy preferences. We directly tackle the old adage "there is no accounting for taste" by using an empirical approach that directly accounts for individual director effects. Our evidence strongly supports the existence and importance of individual director effects for a range of corporate policies directly overseen by boards of directors. These findings provide a new and different perspective on the relation between corporate board attributes and firms' governance, financial, disclosure, and strategic policies.
The business press is replete with examples of how certain managers and directors pursue their own distinctive corporate policies or business strategies. "Neutron" Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric, and "Chainsaw" Al Dunlop, former CEO of Scott Paper, were both renowned for their willingness to initiate mass firings in the early 1990's. These individuals clearly took actions that resulted in layoffs. However, were the layoff decisions uniquely attributable to the specific managers or would any executive have taken the same actions in similar circumstances?
While anecdotes support the notion of an "individual effect", it is difficult to separate firm and manager effects because they are almost always observed together. Bertrand and Schoar (2001) attempt to get around this problem by examining the consistency of corporate policy choices across time by tracking CEOs who move from one firm to another. 1 We undertake a similarly novel investigation in a slightly different setting by examining the consistency of corporate policy choices across firms by identifying corporate directors who simultaneously serve on multiple corporate boards. For example, Franklin D. Raines is the CEO and executive board member of Fannie Mae and he simultaneously serves as an outside director of PepsiCo.
These multi-board membership cases provide a unique experimental setting to test whether an individual's skills or preferences are systematically and consistently reflected in firms' policies.
Recent studies have highlighted a board member's role as a strategic policy consultant to top managers (see, for example, Carpenter and Westphal, 2001 ). Therefore, we explore individual director influence across four key corporate policy categories: governance, financial, disclosure and investor relations, and strategic policies. We specifically focus on policies that are vetted through, approved by, or overseen by the board of directors. The governance policies include the structure of CEO compensation, the existence of a dual CEO/Chairman appointment, the number of outside directors, and the frequency of board meetings. The financial policies include dividend payouts, stock repurchases, cash holdings and leverage. The disclosure and investor relations policies include the frequency of management forecasts, and the outcomes of investor relations activities such as analyst and institutional following. Finally, the strategic policies relate to firms' acquisition and restructuring decisions that must be vetted by the board of directors.
Given that it is difficult to specify ex ante which of these policies will be most influenced by which directors, we also create an aggregate director fixed effect measure that captures the average director impact across policies. This aggregate measure is estimated across all 18 policy policies and only those policies with statistically significant individual director fixed effects.
These approaches allow us to capture the differential impact of individual directors across a full range of firms' corporate policies.
We begin our analysis by examining how much of the variation in firms' corporate policies can be attributed to the presence of individual board members. Similar to Schoar and Bertrand (2002) , we attempt to separate the influence of individuals associated with a firm from those of the firm itself. In our unique multiple-board sample, we examine the role of individual skills or preferences in a cross-sectional setting by considering board members who sit on at least two different corporate boards at the same time. This approach avoids potential timevarying and performance-related confounding effects in a CEO-turnover setting. We first determine how much of the cross-sectional variability in firms' policy choices can be explained by board member fixed effects. Our results show that director-specific effects are economically and statistically significant determinants of a broad range of corporate policy choices. However, there are several competing explanations for this finding: (i) directors match with firms that all face similar economic circumstances, (ii) directors match with firms for reasons not captured by traditional economic factors, and/or (iii) directors impose their preferences on firms resulting in policies unrelated to traditional economic factors.
To distinguish between explanation (i) and explanations (ii) and (iii), we investigate how much of the residual variability in firms' policy choices can be explained by director fixed effects after controlling for traditional economic determinants of these policies. Consistent with prior research, we find that a comprehensive set firm-specific economic factors (i.e., size, performance, growth opportunities, risk, and lifecycle stage) and industry effects explain a significant fraction of firms' policies. However, director fixed effects provide significant incremental explanatory power for firms' policies over and above the traditional economic factors. This finding suggests that the commonality in firms' policies can result from directors imposing their preferences on firms (explanation (iii)) or traditional economic factors not completely capturing the matching process between director and firms (explanation (ii)). Under explanation (iii), corporate policies are initiated by directors and may come as a surprise of other stakeholders possibly because of corporate governance imperfections. Our follow-on empirical tests suggest that the matching interpretation (explanation (ii)) is more plausible because the magnitude of director fixed effects is unrelated to a director's tenure at a firm. In sum, our findings suggest a matching of firms and directors with similar economic characteristics and consistent policy preferences.
Finally, we examine factors that may mitigate or strengthen an individual director's influence on corporate policy choices. For a broad range of policies, we find that director influence decreases for (a) directors with many outside board appointments, (b) directors serving on boards with a large fraction of outside directors, and (c) directors serving on boards of large firms. We also examine whether an individual director's influence increases if he/she serves on a specific policy committee of the board of directors. The empirical tests demonstrate that director fixed effects for compensation policy choices are significant for directors who serve on a firm's compensation committee, but are insignificant for directors not appointed to this committee.
Together, these results suggest an important interplay between director influence and board and firm structure.
In summary, we document that individual director effects are important for a range of policies not previously considered in the literature. The innovative contribution of this paper is that we show that individual board member skills or preferences are often as important as traditional economic factors in determining a full range of firms' corporate policies. In addition, director effects are affected by the structure of the board and board members' competing outside activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our empirical approach. Section 3 discusses the unique data used in the empirical tests. Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes.
Empirical Approach
In this section, we outline an empirical approach to test for similarities in corporate policies across firms sharing common directors. Our main tests use director fixed effects to capture commonality in firms' policies. However, commonalities in firms' economic characteristics may explain the director fixed effects. Therefore, we also investigate how much of the variability in firms' policy choices is explained by director fixed effects after controlling for traditional economic determinants of these policies. We then undertake tests to distinguish between "matching" and "imposition" explanations for the director effects. Finally, we present empirical tests that examine whether a director's influence is affected firm size, board structure, the number of outside board appointments held by the director, and the director's committee assignments.
Existence of director effects
The literature on interlocking directorates supports the view that directors from other boards provide a potentially important conduit for information flows about business practices and policies (e.g. Mizruchi, 1996) . Directors can transfer information about the implementation and efficiency of different practices by observing the consequences of management decisions (e.g., Haunschild, 1993) . Directors can also learn about policy approaches through their communications with other directors in board meetings (i.e. Davis, 1991) .
Prior studies in the economic and sociology literature have investigated individual policy choices in isolation. For example, Hallock (1997) investigates whether firms that have reciprocally interlocking boards of directors pay their CEOs more than other firms. The business sociology literature also investigates the individual outcomes of reciprocally interlocking boards (see, for example, Haunschild and Beckman, 1998, and Mizruchi, 1996) .
Our approach is more general in that we attempt to quantify the extent to which firms' portfolios of corporate policies are associated with specific board members. The analysis focuses on 18 corporate policies under the direct oversight of a company's board of directors. We test for the existence of director effects for each policy in a cross-sectional setting using a sample of directors who sit on multiple firms' boards at the same time. The tests are based on a sequential series of nested and non-nested regressions that explain variation in firms' policy choices using (a) only director fixed effects, (b) only traditional economic factors captured by firm characteristics and industry fixed effects, and (c) the combination of firm characteristics, industry fixed effects, and director fixed effects. Specifically, we estimate the following regressions to determine the relative and incremental explanatory power of traditional economic variables and director fixed effects:
where include additional control variables to capture cross-sectional differences in the ability of individual board members to pursue (potentially) inefficient policies.
Determinants of individual director influence
In this section, we examine factors that can affect the magnitude of individual director fixed effects. First, the media has recently spotlighted directors with multiple board appointments and raised questions whether patterns of mismanagement across firms are associated with these directors. In particular, there are claims that "professional" directors serving on numerous boards have little time to actually influence or monitor corporate decisions at any of the firms (see, for example, Carpenter and Westphal, 2001) . As a result, these directors have little or no consistent influence on firms' policies. If more outside appointments limit a director's policy influence for any given firm, then: where the dependent variable is the same as defined in model [2b] . NumBoards j is the total number of corporate boards that director j serves on. FracOutside j is the average fraction of outside directors appointed to each board that director j serves on. CEO j is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the director serves as CEO on one of the firms' boards, and zero otherwise.
Size j is the average of the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of each firm that director j has a board appointment. Tenure j is the same as defined in regression model [2a] .
Committee appointments and director influence
An individual director's influence on a specific policy is likely to increase if he/she serves on a related policy committee of the board of directors. The particular case of compensation committee appointments provides a unique context to test for director influence on a firm's compensation policies. Therefore, we re-estimate regression model [1d] for CEO compensation for two sub-samples. The first sub-sample consists of directors who serve on the compensation committee for all their board appointments. The second sub-sample consists of directors who never serve on the compensation committee of their boards. If there is a link between decision rights for and individual director influence on CEO compensation policy, then we predict that the director fixed effects will be less pronounced, or even nonexistent, in the second sub-sample.
Sample Selection
The empirical tests rely on several data sources. Data on director and board attributes are The IRRC collects proxy statement information for S&P500, the 400 S&P mid-cap firms and the small-cap S&P 600. Therefore, there are potentially 1,500 firms with director-level information. Table 1 reports information relating to directors for the year 1999. Missing data results in a sample of 1,378 different firms. Some 13,659 directors serve on the boards these 1,378 firms. The sample consists of 8,648 independent directors, 2,141 affiliated directors and 2,870 employee directors. This means about 63% of directors are independent outsiders. This fraction is consistent with numbers reported in previous studies using different data sources (e.g., Bhagat and Black, 2000 and Richardson, 2002) . Overall, IRRC data represent 10,577 unique directors.
Panel B of Panel C reports a measure of industry relatedness. For each director who serves on 2 or more boards, we examine the industry affiliation of each firm (using industry groupings as defined in Fama and French, 1997) . We are trying to identify whether directors serve on boards in the same or different industries. Our measure compares the number of industries that a director is associated with the total number of boards that the director serves on. For example, a director who serves on 3 boards with 2 firms in the same industry and 1 in a different industry will have an industry-relatedness ratio equal to 2/3. It is clear from panel C that this industry relatedness measure is frequently equal to 1, irrespective of the number of boards served. This indicates that directors serve on boards in different industry groupings. Thus, any commonality we see across firms' corporate policy choices is unlikely to be solely driven by industry effects.
Nonetheless, we still control for industry effects in the empirical analysis below.
The remaining panels in Table 1 provide more descriptive statistics on directors. Panel D outlines the affiliation of directors by number of boards served. Not surprisingly, a greater fraction of directors who serve on several boards are classified as independent directors. These individuals are often "professional" directors. Panel E reports descriptive statistics about board characteristics and director-specific information such as age and tenure. For our sample, 62% of directors are classified as outside directors. The mean (median) director is 59 (59) years old and has served on the board for 10 (7) years. There is considerable variation in both age and tenure.
The youngest (oldest) director in our sample is 26 (94) with tenure and the number of boards served on. The mean tenure is about 9-10 years irrespective of the number of boards a director serves on. It is difficult to interpret the results for directors who serve on 7 and 8 boards because there are very few observations in these categories.
Policy variables
We focus on corporate policy categories that are directly influenced by the board of directors. The four key categories are governance, financial, disclosure and investor relations, and strategic policies. Moreover, we specifically focus on 18 policies that are vetted through, approved by, or overseen by the board of directors. These policies are not fixed in stone and can vary over the tenure of a director. Following our discussion in section 2, we focus on the relation between director specificity and firms' longer-run policy choices. Therefore, all financial policy variables are calculated using averages of yearly data for the period 1995-1999. We choose this period as it immediately precedes the year for which have director data from IRRC. The averaging of the policy variables also smoothes out year-to-year fluctuations unrelated to director-specific effects.
Our final sample is restricted to the following set of firms: (1) Table 3 consists of 3,428 director-firm observations. In the regression analysis in section 4, each director is assigned an indicator variable. This set of indicator variables identifies director fixed effects for our regression tests. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the four corporate policy categories.
Governance policy variables
We examine five major governance policies directly set by the board of directors including compensation, dual CEO-Chairman appointments, # outsiders on the board, board size, and frequency of board meetings. Prior research has shown that the primary firm-level economic determinants of these policies are firm size, growth opportunities, and industry affiliation (see, for example, Murphy, 1999 , Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997 , and Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001 ). The descriptive statistics for these policy variables are presented in Panel A of 
Disclosure and investor relation policy variables
The key disclosure and investor relations policies we examine are related to management forecast activity and investor relations outcomes as measured by analyst and institutional following. Prior research has shown that the primary firm-level economic determinants of these policies are firm size, growth opportunities, performance, variance in earnings, and industry affiliation (see, for example, Bhushan, 1989 , O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990 , and Waymire, 1985 . 
Strategic policy variables
The descriptive statistics for the acquisitions and restructuring policy variables are reported in Panel D of reflects the number of times that the firm reported material acquisition activities from 1995-1999. The median number of active acquisition years is 2 for the 5 year sample period. Goodwill (value of goodwill on the balance sheet scaled by average total assets) reflects the firm's tendency to implement certain acquisition strategies (stock or cash-based) and is captured in the accounting for these transactions. Average recorded goodwill is 3% of total assets.
Finally, we look at the tendency of the firm to engage in restructuring transactions that result in special items. This is captured in the average value and the frequency of special items reported in net income. Special items is the average value of special items scaled by total assets.
SPEC CNT is the number of times annual special items were recorded from 1995-1999. If a director has a strong preference for axing divisions this will reflect itself in special items/writedowns.
Regression analysis
In our regression analysis of the determinants of the policy variables, we include a exhaustive set of controls to capture firm-specific economic factors that determine these policies. We also include a vector of 45 industry indicator variables based on the industry classification scheme outlined in Fama and French (1997) . These indicator variables will tend to explain much of the variation in policies because industry economic factors such as competition, regulation, and technology tend to influence firms' policy choices. Therefore, regression model
[1c] and [1d] include a fairly exhaustive set of traditional economic factors that are likely to influence firms' corporate policies.
Are director fixed effects significant?
Our primary empirical analysis is reported in Table 3 . We report the impact of director fixed effects on governance, financial, disclosure and investor relations, and strategic policies in Panels A-C, respectively. We report the adjusted R 2 for the four separate estimations of model 
Are director effects subsumed by economic factors?
In order to determine if the director effects merely capture firm-level economic attributes, we must determine if the director fixed effects have explanatory power incremental to traditional economic determinants of these policies. The second last column in the For all policies, the interquartile spread for the estimated director effects is at least 20% of the mean of the each policy variable. In fact, the interquartile spread equals or exceeds the mean value of the dual CEO/Chairman, management forecast, acquisition, goodwill and special item policy variables. These descriptive findings indicate that director effects can have an economically important impact on firms' policies.
Results on director influence
Given that the director fixed effects have incremental explanatory power over traditional economic determinants of corporate policies, then we must distinguish between the two remaining explanations for the director effects. Explanation (ii) suggests that directors and firms Table 5 , Panel A: Column 2). 7 It should be noted that the regressions control for other cross-sectional board attributes that limit an individual director's ability to impose his/her inefficient policy preferences.
We further explore the role of director influence by directly testing hypotheses H1-H4.
We implement these tests using regression model [2b] and initially focus on the aggregate model that uses the average of the standardized director fixed effect magnitudes across the 18 policy variables (Table 5 , Panel A: Column 1). The competing hypotheses H1a and H1b relate to whether a director's outside appointments mitigates or strengthens the director fixed effects. We find that the coefficient on the number of board appointments is negative and strongly significant. This finding is more consistent with hypothesis H1a and suggests that director influence becomes less pronounced when a director has many board appointments.
Hypothesis H2 predicts that director fixed effects are decreasing in the fraction of (competing) outsiders on the board of directors. As shown in Table 5 , Panel A: Column 1, the coefficient on the average fraction of outside directors on the board is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that individual director effects are weaker in the presence of competing outside directors.
Hypothesis H3 predicts that director effects are more pronounced for directors who also serve as a CEO on one of the firms' boards. However, we find that the CEO dummy variable is not significant which indicates that director effects are no different for directors who serve as a CEO compared to "professional" directors (see Table 5 , Panel A: Column 1).
7 Note that the director sample size drops from 1,348 to 1,433 observations for the alternate aggregate fixed effect variable. The alternate aggregate director fixed effect variable uses only significant individual director fixed effects. In our sample, 5 directors have insignificant director fixed effects for all 18 policy variables and, therefore, are dropped from the regression.
Hypothesis H4 predicts that individual directors of large firms will have a weaker influence on the firm's policies because they face additional monitoring from other stakeholders.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the coefficient on firm size is negative and strongly significant.
The empirical findings for hypotheses H1-H4 are essentially the same using the alternate definition of the aggregate director fixed effect variables calculated using only the individual policy variables with statistically-significant director fixed effects (see Table 5 
Robustness analysis
Finally, we conduct a robustness test for our previous regressions. In Table 6 , we reestimate impact of director fixed effects for a sample of firms where the directors have served on each board for a minimum of five years. We implement this test because the policy variables are averaged over the 1995-1999 period. Therefore, we limit the set of directors to those who have had a chance to influence the policy variables of interest. The impact of director fixed effects for each of the policy variables are very similar to those presented in our main regression results in Table 3 . Therefore, the tenor of our conclusions is unchanged.
Conclusion
This study takes a first step toward answering the question of whether an individual board member's preferences or skills are reflected in firms portfolios of corporate policy choices. We extend the prior literature on corporate board structure and interlocks (i.e., Hermalin and Weishbach, 2001, and Mizruchi, 1996) by examining the role of individual directors on a full range of key policies. We begin our analysis by providing an indication of the importance of board members' effects on firms' observed corporate policies. Our objective is to document how much of the variation in firms' policies can be attributed to board member fixed effects. In our unique board member setting, we can examine the role of individual preferences in a crosssectional setting by considering board members who sit on two or more different company boards at the same time. We then ask, after controlling for industry fix effects and other important firm characteristics, how much of the unexplained variation in firms' policy choices can be explained by board member fixed effects.
Our results show that board of director effects are economically and statistically important determinants of a broad range of governance, disclosure, financial and strategic policy choices. We then attempt to distinguish between three competing interpretations of the significant director fixed effects. The commonality in corporate policies can potentially be explained by: (i) policy matching of directors with firms facing similar economic factors, (ii) policy matching of directors and firms for reasons not captured by traditional economic factors, and/or (iii) directors imposing their preferences on firms resulting in policies unrelated to traditional economic factors. Active choice by directors to select or accept board appointments is a common feature of each of these explanations. However, our empirical evidence is more consistent with the matching interpretations because (a) economic factors subsume some of the director effects, and (b) director-specific fixed effects are the same regardless of a director's tenure at a firm. We also document that the magnitude of director effects are decreasing in firm size, the number of outside board appointments held by a director, and the fraction of competing outside directors on the board. This is consistent with the notion that an individual director's influence is mitigated when there are fewer outside competing interests. Board committee assignments also appear to impact director influence for specific policies.
A caveat to our analysis is that we may actually understate the impact or importance of directors for firms' policies. This possibility arises because firms' selection of directors choice is likely to be endogenous. While we show that traditional economic factors subsume some of the director fixed effects, it is possible that firms choose directors with the unique skills necessary to implement the economically-optimal policies. As a result, director effects may not provide incremental explanatory power over and above economic factors because the optimal policies are already determined by the underlying economic factors. However, the unique director is still vitally important in the implementation of these optimal policies.
The innovative contribution of this paper is that we show that individual director effects are an important determinant of firms' portfolios of policy choices. Given that corporate boards help establish and monitor firms' corporate policies, we show that individual director's help explain commonality in policies. While we document the existence of director fixed effects, we IRRC classifies each director on the board as either an (i) insider, (ii) affiliated, or (iii) independent outsider. Directors are classified as insiders if they are an employee of the firm, or an officer of the firm (if among the five most highly compensated individuals) or they have beneficial ownership of more than 50% of the firm's voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group; e.g. members of a family beneficially own less than 50% individually, but combined own more than 50%). Affiliated directors include former employees of the firm or its affiliates, relatives of current employee of the firm or its affiliates, directors who provides professional services to the firm or its affiliates or to its officers, has any transactional relationship with the firm or its affiliates, founders who are no longer employees, and directors employed by a significant customer or supplier. An independent director is one who has no connection to the firm other than board seat or that the connection is not significant enough to be reported in the proxy statement. The variable Industry_relatedness is equal to the number of unique industry groupings that the director is associated with divided by the number of unique boards the director serves on. For example, a director who serves on the board of directors of 4 firms that are in 3 different industries will have an Industry_relatedness ratio equal to 3/4. Dividends is cash dividends on common and preferred stock (# 127) scaled by average total assets. Repurchases is stock repurchases on common and preferred stock (# 115) scaled by average total assets. Cash Holdings is the level of cash and short term investments (# 1) deflated by end of year assets (# 6). Leverage is the book value of shortterm debt (#34) and long-term debt (#9) scaled by end of year assets. Acquisitions is the average from 1994-199 of outlays on new acquisitions (# 129) scaled by average total assets. ACQ CNT is the sum of firm-year indicator variables equal to 1 if Acquisitions is different from 0 in a given year, 0 otherwise. For example, a firm reporting non-zero acquisitions in 3 years out of the 5 years we examine (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) would have ACQ CNT equal to 3. Special Items is the average from 1994-199 of item #17, deflated by annual average total assets. SPEC CNT is the sum of firm-year indicator variables equal to 1 if Special Items is different from 0 in a given year, 0 otherwise. For example, a firm reporting non-zero special items in 3 years out of the 5 we examine (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) would have SPEC CNT equal to 3. Goodwill is the average value (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) of the level of goodwill (#204) scaled by average total assets.
Panel B: Distribution of number of boards each director serves on

TABLE 3 Regression of policy variables on firm factors and industry and director fixed effects
Regression of policy choice variables on firm economic characteristics and industry and director fixed effects. All regressions have 3,428 director-firm observations, comprising 1,438 unique directors across 885 firms. Dividends is cash dividends on common and preferred stock (# 127) scaled by average total assets. Repurchases is stock repurchases on common and preferred stock (# 115) scaled by average total assets. Cash Holdings is the level of cash and short term investments (# 1) deflated by end of year assets (# 6). Leverage is the book value of shortterm debt (#34) and long-term debt (#9) scaled by end of year assets. 
Panel C: Disclosure and investor relations policies
Panel A -Average standardized director fixed effects
The dependent variable is calculated as the average magnitude of the standardized director fixed effect across the separate policy regressions estimated in Table 3 . The director effect for each policy is standardized to a mean zero and unit variance variable. The dependent variable is the last column is recalculated for each director to include only those director effects for that individually significant at the 10% level.
Determinants of Director Influence
Predicted Sign The governance, disclosure, financial, and strategic policy variables are defined in Table 2 . The dependent variable in each of these regressions is the estimated magnitude of the director fixed effect for the respective policy variable. These fixed effects are from regression model (1d) in Table 3 . We take the absolute value of these fixed effects as we are interested in the magnitude of director's influence on policy variables.
TABLE 6 Robustness analysis: Directors with extended service
Regression of policy choice variables on firm economic characteristics and industry and director fixed effects. The following robustness analysis is based on a restricted sample of directors who have served on the board for at least 5 years. The resulting sample is comprised of 2,019 director-firm observations. The corporate policy variables are defined in Table 2 . 
